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Abstract
This paper examines the role for tax policies in productivity-shock driven
economies with \catching-up-with-the-Joneses" utility functions. The optimal
tax policy is shown to aect the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes,
i.e., \cooling down" the economy with higher taxes when it is \overheating" in
booms and \stimulating" the economy with lower taxes in recessions to keep con-
sumption up. Thus, models with catching-up-with-the-Joneses utility functions
call for traditional Keynesian demand management policies. Parameter values
from Campbell and Cochrane (1995) are also used to illustrate that the necessary
labor taxes can be very high, in the order of 50 percent. However, Campbell and
Cochrane's nonlinear version of the aspiration level in the catching-up-with-the-
Joneses preferences has the additional implication that consumption bunching
can be welfare enhancing.
1
1 Introduction
Envy is one important motive of human behavior. In macroeconomics, theories built
on envy have been used in trying to explain the equity premium puzzle as described by
Mehra and Prescott (1985). Abel (1990) and most recently Campbell and Cochrane
(1995) postulate utility functions exhibiting a desire to \catch up with the Joneses",
i.e., if others consume more today, you yourself will experience a higher marginal
utility from an additional unit of consumption in the future.1 In some ways, the idea
of \catching up with the Joneses" is a variation of the theme of \habit formation",
see Constantinides (1990). The key dierence is that \catching up with the Joneses"
postulates a consumption externality since agents who increase their consumption do
not take into account their eect on the aggregate desire by other agents to \catch
up". Thus, this externality allows room for benecial government intervention. The
optimal tax policy would induce agents in the competitive equilibrium to behave in
a rst-best manner, which is given by the solution to a social planner's problem with
habit formation.
While \catching up with the Joneses" has been the focus of quite some research
in the asset pricing literature, its implications with respect to policy making have
rarely been explored. The purpose of this paper is to do exactly that. In particular, we
examine economies driven by productivity shocks where agents care about consumption
as well as leisure, and there is a \catching-up" term in the consumption part of the
utility function. For simplicity, the model abstracts from capital formation.2 In this
framework, we examine the role for taxing labor income. The optimal tax policy turns
out to aect the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes, i.e., \cooling" down
the economy with higher taxes when it is \overheating" due to a positive productivity
shock. The explanation is that agents would otherwise end up consuming too much in
boom times since they are not taking into account the \addiction eect" of a higher
1Gali (1994) explores an alternative assumption where agents' preferences depend on current in-
stead of lagged per capita consumption (\keeping up with the Joneses" as compared to \catching up
with the Joneses").
2As noted by Lettau and Uhlig (1995), the inclusion of capital formation in models based on
catching-up-with-the-Joneses utility functions have the implication that consumption becomes exces-
sively smooth. For a similar observation and a possible remedy in models with habit formation, see
Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1995).
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consumption level. In recessions, the eect goes the other way around and taxes should
be lowered to \stimulate" the economy by bolstering consumption. Thus, models with
catching-up-with-the-Joneses utility functions call for traditional Keynesian demand
management policies. We also use parameter values from Campbell and Cochrane
(1995) to illustrate that the necessary labor taxes can be very high, in the order of
50 percent. However, Campbell and Cochrane's nonlinear version of the aspiration
level in the catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences has the additional implication
that consumption bunching can be welfare enhancing. As an example, we show how
welfare can be improved upon in their framework by inducing business cycles in an
otherwise stationary environment.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we examine a simple one-shot
model as well as an innite horizon version, where agents care about \keeping up
with the Joneses". The assumption being that contemporaneous average consumption
across all agents enters the utility function. In that case, it turns out that there is a
constant tax rate on labor, which delivers the rst best outcome independent of the
productivity shock. In section 3, we allow the agents' aspiration level to be a geometric
average of past per-capita consumption, i.e., specifying a utility function which exhibits
\catching up with the Joneses". This framework has Keynesian-style countercyclical
policy implications. In section 4, we examine the utility function used by Campbell
and Cochrane (1995), adding another layer of complexity. Here, we are in particular
interested in the quantitative tax implications of their parameter values. Section 5
concludes.
2 Keeping up with the Joneses
We imagine an economy with many consumers, each with the same utility function
(c  C)1    1
1  
 An ;
where c  0 is the individual's consumption, C  0 is average consumption across all
agents and n  0 is labor supplied by the individual. The parameters  2 [0; 1),   0
and A > 0 determine the relative importance of average consumption, the curvature of
the consumption term and the relative importance of leisure. This utility function cap-
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tures the notion of \keeping-up-with-the-Joneses", i.e., average consumption decreases
an individual's level of utility and increases his marginal utility of an additional unit
of consumption. This specication is dierent from the formulation in Abel (1990),
who uses ratios rather than dierences to aggregate consumption, but is in line with
the catching-up formulation in Campbell and Cochrane (1995). No \keeping-up" is
imposed on the leisure part of the utility function. In other words, we assume that
agents are competing in, say, having the biggest car or the biggest house rather than
having the most amount of leisure. The utility in leisure is also assumed to be linear.
This assumption is partly done for convenience, but can also be motivated by indivis-
ibilities in the labor market and is an often used assumption in the real-business cycle
literature, see e.g. Hansen (1985) and the explanations therein. We imagine that the
production function takes the form
c = n ;
where  is a productivity parameter. Thus, there is no capital, and output is simply
linear in labor.
The government levies a at tax  on all labor income and the tax revenues are
then handed back to the agents in a lump-sum fashion. Let v be the lump-sum transfer
to each agent. Since all agents are identical, the government's budget constraint can
be written as
n = v :
A competitive equilibrium is calculated by having an agent maximize the utility
function above with respect to c and n subject to his budget constraint,
c = (1   )n+ v :
A consumer's optimal consumption is then found to be








where average consumption C is taken as given by the individual agent. However, in
an equilibrium it must be true that c = C, so the equilibrium consumption level is











The government's optimal choice of  can be deduced from the solution to the
social planner's problem. The social planner would take the externality into account
be setting C = c in the utility function above, and then maximize with respect to
consumption and labor subject to the technology constraint. The rst-best outcome is
then given by










Comparing the social planner's solution to the competitive equilibrium, we nd:
Proposition 1 (\Keeping up with Joneses")
The rst-best consumption allocation can be achieved with a tax rate
 =  :
This result is quite intuitive. A fraction  of any increase in the representative agent's
consumption does not contribute to his utility since it is oset through the consumption
externality. It is therefore socially optimal to tax away a fraction  of any labor income
so that the agent faces the correct utility tradeo between leisure and consumption. It
can also be noted that the optimal tax is independent of the productivity parameter .
While the tax can potentially be high depending on the value of , it does not react
to current economic conditions. In particular, we do not get any Keynesian eects in
the sense of setting taxes procyclically.
Given the solution above, one can easily examine a dynamic model, in which there











where E0 is the expectation operator conditioned upon information at time 0 and
 2 (0; 1) is a discount factor. The production function is the same as before, and so
are the budget constraints of the government and the agents. There is now also some
stochastic process driving productivity t. Computing the competitive equilibrium
and the social planner's solution amounts to the same calculations as above, since
this dynamic model simply breaks into a sequence of one-shot models. The rst-best
solution is again achieved at  = , i.e., there are no cyclical consequences for the tax
rate.
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Finally, it is worth pointing out that the tax analysis here is closely related to
the literature on redistributive taxation when individual welfare depends on relative
income. Given a social welfare function, Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) analyze how
the standard results of optimal tax theory are altered when individuals care about
relative income, and they demonstrate that the scope for redistribution becomes much
larger. Persson (1995) extends their argument by showing that high taxation can even
constitute a Pareto improvement as long as individuals' pre-tax incomes are not too
dierent. In fact, his discussion of the special case of identical individuals corresponds
directly to our treatment of \keeping up with the Joneses".
3 Catching up with the Joneses
3.1 The model
We now assume that the utility function does not depend on current average consump-













In particular, we let the aspiration level Xt be a geometric average of past per-capita
consumption levels,
Xt = (1  )Ct 1 + Xt 1 ; (3)
with 0   < 1 and 0   < 1. Otherwise, the production technology and the budget
constraints of the consumers and the government are the same as before. In addition,












(1 + t) ; (4)
where  2 [0; 1) and t is i.i.d, has mean zero and is bounded below by t >  1.3
3The stochastic process (4) is approximately the same as postulating an AR(1) process for the
logarithm of t,
log(t) = (1   ) log() +  log(t 1) + t :
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For the competitive equilibrium in this model, one nds analogously to (1) that the
agent will set consumption equal to








Thus, given a rst-best path for consumption ct = C

t , one can achieve this outcome







To characterize the optimal tax policy, we now turn to the social planner's problem.
3.2 Solving the social planner's problem
The social planner maximizes the utility function (2) subject to the production technol-
ogy and the constraint (3), taking as given the process for t and the initial conditions
X0 and 0. Since this maximization problem is a concave one, we can analyze it by
using rst-order conditions. Let t be the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (3).











+ Et [t+1] : (8)
The rst equation contains the additional third term (1   )t as compared to the
corresponding equation of the private agent's optimization problem. Here, the social
planner takes into account the \bad" eect on future utility of additional aggregate
consumption today, since it raises the aspiration level Xt+1 tomorrow and beyond. In
particular, a fraction (1   ) of an increase in today's per-capita consumption spills
over to Xt+1, and the shadow value of a higher Xt+1 is given by t. Equation (8)
shows in turn how the shadow value t is the sum of the expected eect on tomorrow's
discounted marginal utility of consumption and its impact on still future periods. The
Thus, our exact analytical results below pertaining to the stochastic process (4) can also be interpreted
as approximations to the corresponding formulas valid for the more commonly used AR(1) process
for the logarithm of t.
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latter eect is captured by the discounted expected value of t+1 multiplied by ,
where  is the fraction of the aspiration level that carries over between two consecutive
periods.
Using the two rst-order conditions (7) and (8) as well as the constraint (3), the














Comparing this expression to the agent's consumption rule in equation (5) and noting






For example, if the aspiration level is simply  times the level of yesterday's per-capita
consumption ( = 0), we get  = . This formula is rather intuitive compared to
the simple model above of \keeping up with the Joneses", where we got  = . Since
the consumption externality now enters the utility function with a one-period lag, the
adverse future eect of being \addicted" to today's consumption is discounted by  so
the optimal steady-state tax rate is also scaled down by .
In order to characterize the optimal consumption and taxation outside of a steady
state, we can actually solve the dynamic equations in closed form. The substitution
of equation (7) into (8) yields a rst-order dierence equation in the shadow value t,











 = (+ (1   )) < 1 :
















After substituting this expression into the rst-order condition (7), the optimal con-
sumption level is found to be





















The tax necessary to support this optimal consumption allocation is then given by
equation (6).
Rather than calculating the tax rate t, it is more appealing to calculate the ratio






t t : (12)
With the productivity process in (4), t is given by (10) and the tax ratio can then be
rewritten as in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (\Catching up with Joneses")



















3.3 Tax policy implications
Corollary 1 (\Catching up with Joneses")
The optimal tax policy aects the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes.
This corollary follows directly from equation (13), the tax ratio (and thus the tax rate
itself) varies positively with productivity t.4 Thus, we get Keynesian-style policy rec-
ommendations. A government that maximizes welfare should \cool down" the economy
4It is worth noting that this result holds for a much larger class of stochastic processes than given
by equation (4). According






decreases less than proportionally with the inverse of t.
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during booms via higher taxes because agents would otherwise consume too much as
compared to the rst-best solution. Likewise, the government should \stimulate" the
economy during recessions by lowering taxes and thereby bolstering consumption. Of
course, these optimal scal policies are here driven by a rather unorthodox argumen-
t. Taxation is needed to oset the externalities associated with private consumption
decisions. One individual's consumption aects the welfare of others through agents'
desire to \catch up with the Joneses".
To shed light on how dierent parameters aect the cyclical variations of optimal
taxation, let !t be the relative deviation of the tax ratio t=(1   t) from its steady-
state value. That is, !t tells us, how the ratio of taxes to after-tax income responds
















Doing comparative statics on this expression, we see that the size of the cyclical tax
eect in absolute terms varies negatively with  and positively with ,  and . The
intuition for this is straightforward by considering the tax response to a positive pro-
ductivity shock. A higher  , i.e., a more persistent productivity shock, means that
future production and consumption opportunities are also expected to be better than
average. The anticipation of the economy being able to sustain a higher consumption
level for a prolonged period of time mitigates the adverse eects of making people
\addicted" to higher consumption today. It is therefore socially optimal to take more
advantage of a persistent productivity shock, so the optimal tax hike is lower with a
higher  . In contrast, preferences with a higher weight on yesterday's consumption
(a higher ), a higher degree of persistence in the aspiration level (a higher ), or a
higher emphasis on the future (a higher ) give rise to a larger cyclical tax eect. The
reason is, of course, that the consumption externality is more important for such pref-
erences and the government must consequently be more resolute in moderating agents'
consumption behavior.
As a point of reference, the largest tax eect as dened by (14) is attained for
transient one-period productivity shocks ( = 0). The percentage deviation of the tax
ratio from its steady-state value responds then one-for-one to the percentage change
in the productivity from its steady state. However, besides noting that the cyclical
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tax eect can be large relative to the magnitude of the productivity shock, it is also
important to keep in mind that most aggregate economic shocks are usually relatively
small so the cyclical tax changes considered here are really examples of extreme \ne
tuning" of taxes.
Finally, Figure 1 illustrates the consumption dynamics in response to a productivity
shock. After a one-percent initial shock to t at time t = 0, the hump-shaped dashed
line traces out the response of consumption from the steady state when taxes are ad-
justed optimally and the solid line displays the consumption response when the tax
rate is not changed but kept constant at its steady-state value. As a parameterization,
we used  = 0:9,  = 0:8,  = 0:97 and varied  2 f0:5; 1:5g. Not surprisingly, the con-
sumption response becomes muted with a higher , since a more rapidly diminishing
marginal utility of consumption reduces the attractiveness of increasing consumption.
It is interesting to note that for both values of  in Figure 1 the deviation of consump-
tion from steady state is reduced by around 25 % under optimal tax adjustment as
compared to keeping the tax rate constant at its steady-state value. The gure also
contain the change in the tax ratio !t needed to accomplish this \cooling down" of the
economy.
4 The Campbell-Cochrane utility function
We now turn to the utility function proposed by Campbell and Cochrane (1995) ex-
tended with a linear disutility term for labor. These preferences are then also given
by our expression (2), but the aspiration level Xt is now a complex nonlinear function
of current and past per-capita consumption as shown below.5 A useful concept when





and the upper case letter St will be used to denote the economy-wide value of st. In
an equilibrium, St will of course be equal to st since all agents are identical.
5Our notation diers from Campbell and Cochrane (1995) in order to stay consistent with the
notation above. In particular, we use hats rather than small letters to denote logs, while small letters
still denote the individual's choice variables. We use  instead of  for the discount factor and we
abstract from growth, i.e., their parameter g is here set equal to zero.
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Panel A:  Gamma = 0.5
Consumption under tax adj.
Consumption without tax adj.
Tax ratio
Productivity































Panel B:  Gamma = 1.5
Consumption under tax adj.
Consumption without tax adj.
Tax ratio
Productivity
Figure 1: Consumption dynamics in response to a one-percent productivity shock from
the steady state. The dash-dotted line depicts the optimal response in the tax ratio
t=(1   t). The parameters are  2 f0:5; 1:5g (panel A and panel B, respectively),
 = 0:9,  = 0:8, and  = 0:97.
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Campbell and Cochrane postulate an implicit law of motion for Xt by writing a
law of motion for St. Let Ŝt  log St be the logarithm of the economy-wide surplus
consumption ratio, and likewise Ĉt  logCt is the logarithm of average consumption
across all agents. Abstracting from economic growth, it is then assumed that St evolves
according to











1   2(Ŝ   log S)  1; Ŝ  Ŝmax
0; Ŝ  Ŝmax
(16)




=2.6 Given equation (15), one can back out the implied
law of motion for Xt. Near the steady state, a log-linear approximation shows that the
log of Xt is a moving average of past consumption in logs and it does not depend on
contemporaneous consumption,




For our purposes, the steady-value S can be thought of as a parameter in this model. By
picking a value of S, we are eectively choosing a particular preference specication.7
Taking Xt as given, the agent maximizes utility subject to the usual budget con-
straint. Analogously to the previous sections, the agent's optimal consumption is found
to be














6The purpose of Campbell and Cochrane's rather complicated preference specication is to assure
that ct  Xt  0, and that the risk-free rate is constant when ĉt is a random walk with drift.
7To understand the correspondence between S and the preference specication, let us consider the
model in Section 3 where S = ( C   X)= C = ( C    C)= C = 1   . That is, S maps directly into
 and is unaected by the tax rate. (The only exception being a 100 % tax rate which would close
down all economic activity, and the surplus consumption ratio would no longer be dened.)
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Instead of solving the social planner's problem, we now turn to a more modest
question. In a steady state, we ask what tax rate is needed to support the best possible
constant consumption level. (The word `constant' will soon be shown to be restrictive
in terms of maximizing welfare).
Proposition 3 (Campbell-Cochrane)
In a steady state with  > 1, there exists a unique consumption level that cannot be
improved upon through a once-and-for-all change to another consumption level. The





(1   S) :
The derivation of this proposition is deferred to the appendix, and here we only note
that the tax rate is the same as the steady-state tax rate for the usual linear version of
the aspiration level in Proposition 2. To see this, we only have to use the observation
in footnote 7 which is that the parameter  and the steady state surplus consumption
ratio satisfy the relationship S = 1  .
It is also interesting to take a look at the quantitative tax implication of Proposi-
tion 3. Campbell and Cochrane use the parameters  = 0:973,  = 0:97 and S = 0:049.
For these parameters, we obtain
 = 0:494;
i.e., almost 50 percent of labor income should be taxed away in steady state in order
to support the best possible constant consumption level. Taken seriously, this would
indicate that current labor taxes are too low in the United States, but about right in,
say, the Netherlands or Sweden.
Finally, we have refrained from using the word `rst-best outcome' simply since we
have not presented the optimal solution to the social planner's problem. The noncon-
cave character of this maximization problem makes it analytically intractable, so here
we rather use an example to demonstrate that consumption bunching can improve upon
a constant consumption allocation. In particular, Figure 2 explores the welfare con-
sequences of a temporary one-period increase in consumption starting from a steady
state with the best possible constant consumption level C, as described in Proposi-
tion 3. The x-axis in Figure 2 shows the size of the one-period consumption deviation
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as percentage of C, and the y-axis depicts the life-time utility associated with that
policy. It is clear from the gure that there are one-time consumption deviations that
can increase life-time utility. The intuition is that a temporary consumption increase
acts as an `investment' in the surplus consumption ratio S because of the persistence
parameter  in equation (15). But let us rst consider what happens in the rst pe-
riod when the consumption hike takes place. Equation (15) shows how the log of S
increases by the logdeviation in consumption multiplied by the steady-state value of
the -function. Since the -function is decreasing in the surplus consumption ratio, it
follows that the negative impact on S is smaller in the next period when consumption
reverts back to C. In fact, there is no eect at all if the log of the surplus consump-
tion ratio has reached Ŝmax in equation (16) when the -function becomes zero. (This
critical point shows up as a kink on the curve in panel B of Figure 2.) In consecu-
tive periods, welfare is positively aected by the slowly decaying surplus consumption
ratio (while consumption is kept constant at C). Concerning the parameterization in
Figure 2, we have used Campbell and Cochrane's values mentioned above and their
parameter  = 2:372, and we have set A =  = 1.
Figure 2 suggests that a rst-best outcome for the Campbell-Cochrane utility func-
tion will involve consumption cycles even in an otherwise stationary environment. The
social planner would like to exploit the law of motion for the surplus consumption
ratio in order to increase the well-being of individuals. The rationale for this is that
the dynamics of the law of motion for the surplus consumption ratio can be said to ex-
hibit increasing returns to scale. For a related argument on welfare-improving cycles in
models with increasing-returns-to-scale production technologies, see Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1989).
5 Conclusions
This paper examined the role for tax policies in simple productivity-shock driven e-
conomies with \catching-up-with-the-Joneses" utility functions. These utility functions
give rise to consumption externalities, but taxation can be used to get back to the rst-
best solution. The optimal tax policy turns out to aect the economy countercyclically
via procyclical taxes. When the economy is \overheating" due to a positive produc-
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Figure 2: Impact on life-time utility of a one-period consumption deviation from the
steady state in Proposition 3. Panel B is a magnication of the left-hand portion of
panel A. The parameters are  = 0:973,  = 0:97 and S = 0:049,  = 2:372, and
A =  = 1.
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tivity shock, a welfare-maximizing government should raise taxes to \cool down" the
economy. Likewise, taxes should be cut in recessions to \stimulate" the economy by bol-
stering consumption. Thus, models with catching-up-with-the-Joneses utility functions
call for traditional Keynesian demand management policies. We also used parameter
values from Campbell and Cochrane (1995) to illustrate that the necessary labor taxes
can be very high, in the order of 50 percent. However, Campbell and Cochrane's non-
linear version of the aspiration level in the catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences has
the additional implication that consumption bunching can be welfare enhancing. An
example was used to illustrate how welfare can be improved upon in their framework
by inducing business cycles in an otherwise stationary environment.
17
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us start our argument from an arbitrary initial steady state with consumption
C (and a surplus consumption ratio of S). At time t = 0, we consider an alternative
future consumption allocation of Ct = C0 for all t  0. According to equation (15),
the associated sequence of surplus consumption ratios can be expressed in log form as
Ŝ0 = log S + (Ĉ0   log C) ;
Ŝt = (1   ) log S +  Ŝt 1 = (1   
t) log S + t Ŝ0 ; for t  1 ;







; for t  0 :










































A = 0 : (18)
For any initial steady state C, equation (18) can be used to solve for the best C0
when we are constrained to only consider once-and-for-all changes in the consumption
level. To nd the unique constant consumption level that cannot be improved upon in
this way, we solve for C in equation (18) such that C0 = C. The best possible constant

















To support this consumption allocation in a competitive equilibrium, we rst solve for




with a steady-state value of




After substituting equation (19) and  = S 1  1 into this expression, we arrive at the
steady-state tax rate in Proposition 3.
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